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I N R E P L Y R E F E R T O : 
Re: Becky Lowe v. Sorenson Research Company, Inc. 
Case No. 20395 
Dear Clerks 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the following citations are supplemental cases decided 
since the filing of the Supreme Court brief by counsel for defendant-
respondent Sorenson Research Company, Inc. which have a direct 
impact on the above-entitled matter. 
1. Rose v. Allied Development Company, 719 P.2d 
83 (Utah 1986) [Rejects the claim for breach of covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in a suit for wrongful termination 
and held that because the employment was terminable-at-will 
the court found no cause of action could exist for breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.] See Brief 
of defendant-respondent, pps. 7-23. 
2. Ericksen v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., 119 
L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 3621 (N.D. 111. 1984) [The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying 
Illinois law, dismissed the claim of an at-will employee for 
wrongful termination based upon the alleged breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, noting that the good 
faith obligation does not create an independent cause_of action, 
See Brief of defendant-respondent, pps. 7-23. FILED 
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3. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th 
Cir. 1986) [Rejects the argument that an employee handbook 
establishes an employment contract.] See Brief of defendant-respondent, 
pps. 23-30. 
Ericksen v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co, 119 
L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 3621 (N.D. Illn. 1984) [Reaffirms general 
rule that an employment handbook is not part of an employment 
contract and affirms dismissal of action for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted.] See Brief of defendant-
respondent, pps. 23-30. 
Very truly yours, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Randall N. Skanchy 
RNS/mb 
cc: H. Ralph Klemm (w/o enclosures) 
E R I C K S E N v. T R A N S A T L A N T I C R E I N S U R A N C E CO. 119 L R R M 3621 
F.2d 572, 117 L R R M 2941 (6th Cir. 
1984) (en banc). If, as claimed by plain-
tiffs, his action accrued on Ju ly 10 
when he actually received the arb i t ra -
tion papers then the i n s t an t action is 
not t ime-barred. 
Plaintiff's own affidavit introduced 
into evidence indicates t h a t he learned 
of the ac tual contents of the arb i t ra -
tion panel 's award on Ju ly 7 when he 
met with appeal officials to discuss the 
si tuation. He had ac tua l knowledge 
then of the award regardless of wha t 
the union officials told h im about dis-
cont inuing his "moonlighting." He 
also knew on Ju ly 7 wha t the union 
had done in pursu ing his grievance to 
arbi t ra t ion and t h a t the union would 
no longer contest the award which ad-
versely affected him.2 There was no 
substant ia l factual controversy, then, 
concerning what plaintiff reasonably 
knew about the union 's alleged breach 
of duty and the company's r ight to 
insist upon its rule l imiting his outside 
business pursui t s on Ju ly 7, 1981. 
[1] For purposes of a hybrid §301/un-
fair representat ion action, the t ime 
the s t a tu te of l imitations begins to r u n 
is when the c la imant knows or should 
have known of the union 's alleged 
breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion See Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia 
Co , 742 F.2d 612, 614, 117 L R R M 2784 
(11th Cir. 1984); Metz v. Tootsie Roll 
Ind., Inc., 715 F.2d 299, 304, 114 L R R M 
2340 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 
S.Ct. 976, 115 L R R M 2360 (1984); San -
tos v. Distr ict Council, 619 F.2d 963, 
969, 103 L R R M 3082 (2d Cir. 1980), 
Shapiro v Cook United Inc., 762 F.2d 
49, 119 L R R M 2583, No. 83-3087, slip 
op. a t 3 (6th Cir 5/17/85) (per curiam), 
and Northwest Ind. Credit Union v. 
Salisbury, et al., No. 84-1115 (6th Cir. 
7/11/85) (unpublished per curiam). 
Regardless of plaintiff's belief of 
wha t the arbi t ra t ion award entailed, 
he claimed, essentially, t h a t the Union 
had not adequately prepared and pre-
sented his position dur ing the arbi t ra-
tion hearing. Dowty, however, knew of 
or learned about all the facts relat ing 
1
 In addition to that part of the award set out in 
footnote 1, it provided in pertinent part 
The Board of Arbitration finds and determines 
on the basis of the evidence adduced at the arbi-
tration hearing, and consideration of documen-
tary exhibits, and post hearing briefs that the 
company's policy prohibiting certain types of 
"after-hours" work, or "moonlighting" on the 
part of its employees is reasonable, and within 
the recognized rights of management the 
company's policy was orally communicated to 
the grievant in 1973 at the time he was hired, 
and that said policy was set forth in written 
form in 1977, 
The Union is accorded the contractual right in 
each instance to challenge a plant rule, or policy 
unilaterally drafted by the company including 
the right to grieve the application of a rule 
to the Union's preparat ion of his case 
by t h e Ju ly 7 meeting. Coggins' asser-
tion was not contradicted t ha t plain-
tiff had read the Union's post-hearing 
brief several times. We find no error, 
then, m the determination by the dis-
t r ic t court: 
During the meeting held on [July 7, 1981], 
plaintiff learned of the arbitration panel's 
decision, read the hearing briefs of the 
union, and was informed of the response 
of the union to the decision At that time, he 
was also aware of the union's conduct dur-
ing the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure, including the fact that the union had 
refused to permit him to be represented by 
his own counsel By July 7, plaintiff was 
armed with all the facts with which he (or his 
attorney) needed to draft fl23 in the com-
plaint], which alleges that the union 
breached its duty of fair representation In 
short, by July 7, 1981, plaintiff "knew or 
reasonably should have known that" the 
union, in his opinion, had breached its duty 
of fair representation (emphasis added.) 
[2] We are not persuaded by plain-
tiff's a rgumen t t h a t he cannot be 
deemed to have knowledge unt i l he re-
ceives formal notice of the arbi t ra tor ' s 
decision and award. Fai lure of a n em-
ployee to receive a copy of an arbi t ra-
tion decision does not toll the r u n n i n g 
of l imitations periods in §301 actions 
when he knows wha t the union has 
done to represent his interests and es-
sentially the disposition of his griev-
ance. See Brown v. Duff Truck Lines, 
I n c , 557 F S u p p . 194, 196, 117 L R R M 
3076 (S.D. Ohio 1983). To uphold plain-
tiff's contention, as the district court 
cogently noted, even if a c la imant 
knew about the contents of an arbi t ra-
tion decision, his cause of action would 
never accrue if he never obtained a 
copy of the decision. We reject plain-
tiff's contention accordingly. 
We affirm the judgment of the dis-
tr ict cour t t h a t the six month ' s l imita-
tion bars plaintiff's claims b u t remand 
for en t ry of the district court 's final 
judgment as of August 26, 1981 
ERICKSEN v. TRANSATLANTIC 
REINSURANCE CO. 
U.S. District Court, 
Nor the rn District of Illinois 
ERICKSEN V. TRANSATLANTIC 
REINSURANCE COMPANY, INC., et 
al., No. 84 C 2070, September 6, 1984 
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
1. Wrongful discharge — Exceptions 
to general rule — Employee handbook 
•175.117 •170.503 •170.508 
Exceptions to general rule in Illinois 
t h a t employment handbook is not pa r t 
119 L R R M 3622 ERICKSEN v. TRANSATLANTIC R E I N S U R A N C E CO. 
of employment cont rac t arise where (1) 
handbook is adopted as modification of 
pre-existing employment contract and 
consideration exists to create m u t u a l -
ity of obligations, and (2) another doc-
u m e n t exists which can be construed 
as express employment contract t h a t 
is subject to "policies" of employer. 
2. Wrongful discharge — Breach of 
contract — Employment manual — 
Consideration •170*503 •170.508 
Discharged at-will employee fails to 
s ta te claim for breach of contract , de-
spite content ion t h a t employment 
m a n u a l received after employee was 
hired expressed company policy 
against a rb i t ra ry terminat ion; con-
t inu ing to work after inception of per-
sonnel policy is not consideration for 
policy so as to render t h a t policy p a r t 
of employment contract . 
3. Wrongful discharge — Breach of 
'good faith' covenant •170.512 
At-will employee fails to s tate claim 
for breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in employment 
cont rac t result ing from his alleged 
wrongful discharge, where employee 
alleges no specific contrac tual obliga-
tion t h a t has been violated by 
employer. 
4. Wrongful discharge — Defama-
tion •170.64 •172.1071 •172.0812 
Sta temen t by employer t h a t audi t of 
te rminated employee's client files re-
vealed them to be poorly quoted, h a n -
dled, and documented does not im-
p u g n employee's professional fitness 
or ability to perform his job Alleged 
defamatory s ta tement , as mat te r of 
law, reasonably may be innocently 
construed as no t imput ing any unfit-
ness or lack of ability on employee's 
par t . 
Peter Andjelkovich & Associates, 
Chicago, 111, for plaintiff. 
P . Kevin Connelly (Lederer, Reich, 
Sheldon & Connelly), Chicago, 111., for 
defendants. 
Full Text of Opinion 
LEIGHTON, Distr ict Judge. — This 
cause comes before t he cour t on the 
motion of plaintiff, William K. Erick-
sen, to amend his complaint, join a 
necessary pa r ty defendant, and to re-
m a n d the cause to s ta te court. Also 
before the court is the motion of defen-
dan t s Transa t l an t i c Reinsurance Co., 
Inc., American In terna t ional Group, 
Inc. d/b/a Transa t l an t i c Reinsurance 
Co., Inc. and d/b/a American In terna-
tional Underwriters Agency, Inc., and 
F r a n k Robbins, p u r s u a n t to Fed R 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss all counts of 
plaintiff's complaint for failure to 
s tate a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. For t he following reasons, 
plaintiff's motion is denied; defen-
dant ' s motion is granted. 
Plaintiff was employed by defen-
dants Transa t lan t ic Reinsurance Co., 
Inc. and American Internat ional 
Group, Inc., for a period of over six 
years. He began as an underwriter, 
and later achieved the position of Ca-
sualty Manager and Branch Manager 
On May 18, 1983, plaintiff's direct su-
pervisor, F r a n k Robbins, terminated 
plaintiff's employment. 
On February 17, 1984, plaintiff 
b rought sui t against defendants in the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 
alleging wrongful termination, breach 
of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and defamation Defendants, 
based on diversity of citizenship, 28 
U.S.C §1332, removed the action to 
federal court on March 8, 1984 pursu-
a n t to 28 U S . C §1441. On March 13, 
1984, the part ies submitted the mo-
tions presently before the court. 
In his motion to amend the com-
plaint, plaintiff alleges t h a t Bruce 
Ebert, an Illinois citizen and Resident 
Vice-President of American In terna-
tional Group, Inc., is a necessary par ty 
defendant in this action However, 
plaintiff avers no facts in support of 
his claim; nor can the court glean 
from the conclusory na tu r e of the mo-
tion how Ebert might be thought to be 
a person in whose absence relief could 
not be granted A motion to amend a 
pleading, as with all motions general-
ly, mus t conform to the part iculari ty 
requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b). 
Mere conclusory allegations are insuf-
ficient Mart inez v. T rampr , 556 F 2 d 
818 (7th Cir. 1977). Because the motion 
fails to meet these requirements, it is 
denied The court, therefore, does not 
reach the remand issue. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss 
all counts of plaintiff's complaint I t is 
axiomatic t h a t under Fed R Civ P 
12(b)(6), a complaint should be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim only 
if it appears beyond doubt t ha t a 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would enti-
tle h im to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41, 45-46, 41 L R R M 2089 (1957) 
For purposes of this discussion, 
Counts I and HI, alleging wrongful 
ERICKSEN v. TRANSATLANTIC REINSURANCE CO. 119 L R R M 3623 
termination' will be considered to-
gether, as will Counts n and IV, alleg-
ing breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing.2 Count V, alleging 
d e f a m a t i o n , wi l l be c o n s i d e r e d 
separately. 
The gravamen of the wrongful ter-
mination counts is an alleged dis-
charge in violation of a company "per-
sonnel policy manual." Plaintiff, an 
at-will employee, assets that the man-
ual expressed a company policy 
against arbitrary termination. The 
manual states, in pertinent part: 
Infractions of company policy or conduct 
unacceptable to the orderly and efficient 
operations of the company's business re-
quire corrective action. It should be empha-
sized that all disciplinary action must be 
administered both fairly and consistently 
with the intent of correcting unacceptable 
behavior not punishing it. 
The import of plaintiff's argument is 
that the handbook takes his employ-
ment out of the at-will category, and 
transforms it into a contractual rela-
tionship, for which he can bring an 
action in breach. 
[1] However, Illinois follows the gen-
eral rule that an employment hand-
book is not part of an employment 
contract. Enis v. Continental Illinois 
National Bank & Trust, 582 F.Supp. 
876, 878, 116 LRRM 2047 (N.D. 111. 
1984); Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 560 
F.Supp. 619, 624, 115 LRRM 4692 (N.D. 
111. 1983); Sargent v. Illinois Institute 
of Technology, 78 Ill.App.3d 117, 121, 
397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979). There 
are two exceptions to the general rule. 
The first is where the handbook is 
adopted as a modification of a pre-
existing employment contract and 
consideration exists to create mutual-
ity of obligations. Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp., 560 F.Supp. at 624; Carter v. 
Kaskaskia Community Action Agen-
cy, 24 Ill.App.3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d 
574 (5th Dist. 1974). The second arises 
where another document exists which 
1
 Plaintiff also claims an action for discrimina-
tion under the Illinois Human Rights Act, Ill.Rev-
.8tat. ch. 68, HI.101 et seq. (1981). That statute 
rovides a comprehensive scheme for damages 
ased on alleged discriminatory actions, pre-empt-
ing such claims as the one in question. Curtis v. 
Continental Illinois National Bank, 568 F.Supp. 
740, 742, 32 FEP Cases 1540 (N.D. HI. 1983). 2
 In his memorandum in opposition to defen-
dants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff would have the 
court construe these counts as stating a claim for 
retaliatory discharge under Kelsay v. Motorola, 
Inc., 74 ni.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 115 LRRM 4371 
(1978), and Palmateer v. International Harvester 
Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876, 115 LRRM 4165 
(1981). The court declines the invitation. In decid-
ing a motion to dismiss, a court is obliged to look to 
the face of the pleadings only. Since plaintiff's 
original complaint does not frame the issue of 
retaliatory discharge, it will not be considered. For 
the same reason, the court will not look outside the 
pleadings and consider the affidavits attached to 
defendants' motion. 
can be construed as an express em-
ployment contract and the contract is 
subject to the "policies" of the employ-
er. Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 560 
F.Supp. at 624; Piper v. Board of 
Trustees of Community College Dis-
trict No. 514, 99 Ill.App.3d 752, 760, 426 
N.E.2d 262 (3d Dist. 1981). 
[2] Plaintiff's allegations do not trig-
ger application of the first exception. 
While it is true that the manual in 
question was adopted after plaintiff's 
employment, it was not adopted under 
circumstances creating mutuality of 
obligation. Plaintiff's complaint states 
only that "he read the manual, and 
honored its provisions in the perform-
ance of his managerial responsibil-
ities." Merely continuing to work after 
the inception of a personnel policy is 
not consideration for the policy, so as 
to render that policy part of the em-
ployment contract. Rynar v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 560 F.Supp. at 625. The 
second exception to the rule is inappli-
cable here, as plaintiff alleges no sepa-
rate employment contract. According-
ly, the general rule that an 
employment handbook is not part of 
an employment contract will be hon-
ored and Counts I and III are dis-
missed for failure to state a claim. 
[2, 3] In Counts II and IV, plaintiff 
alleges breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing in connection with 
the alleged wrongful termination. 
While the obligation to deal in good 
faith is implied in all contracts, such 
an obligation "is in aid and further-
ance of other terms of the agreement 
of the parties." Murphy v. American 
Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 
304, 448 N.E.2d 86, 115 LRRM 4953 
(C.A. N.Y. 1983). It does not create an 
independent cause of action. Gordon v. 
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 562 
F.Supp. 1286, 1290, 115 LRRM 4100 
(N.D. m. 1983). As stated in Gordon, 
"the principle of good faith comes into 
play in defining and modifying duties 
which grow out of specific contract 
terms and obligations. It is a derivative 
principle." Id. at 1289. Since no specif-
ic contractual obligation is alleged 
here, the good faith principle does not 
come into play as a cause of action. 
Counts II and IV are therefore 
dismissed. 
[4] In Count V of his complaint, 
plaintiff claims that defendants de-
famed him by communicating to his 
fellow employees allegedly "scandalous 
slander of and concerning plaintiff in 
his employment." A false statement 
which imputes that a person lacks 
ability in his profession or that he is 
unfit to perform his employment du-
ties is actionable as defamation. 
Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill.App.3d 
119 L R R M 3624 L O C O M O T I V E E N G I N E E R S v. ICC 
536, 542, 447 N.E.2d 446 (2d Dist. 1983); 
Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 
Ill.App.3d 452, 456, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1st 
Dist. 1979). 
In Illinois, actions for libel and slan-
der are controlled by the innocent con-
s t ruct ion rule, announced in J o h n v. 
T r ibune Co., 24 I11.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 
105 (1962), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 877, 
and modified in Chapski v. Copley 
Press, 92 I11.2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 
(1982); Fried v. Jacobson, 99 I11.2d 24, 
457 N.E.2d 392 (1983). The rule requires 
tha t , where reasonable, s ta tements 
m u s t be innocently construed. T h e 
question of whether a s ta tement may 
reasonably be innocently construed is 
initially a ma t t e r of law; only if i t is 
not capable of being so construed may 
the question be given to the finder of 
fact for a determinat ion of whether it 
actual ly was so understood. Chapski v. 
Copley Press, 92 I11.2d a t 352; Pau l v. 
Premier Electrical Construction Co., 
581 F.Supp. 721, 723 (N.D. 111. 1984); 
Spelson v. CBS, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 1195, 
1200-1201 (N.D. 111. 1984). 
Applying the innocent construction 
rule to the case a t bar, the court finds 
t h a t the allegedly defamatory s ta te-
m e n t is susceptile of innocent con-
struct ion, and may reasonably be in-
terpreted as no t imput ing any 
unfitness or lack of ability on plain-
tiff's par t . The remark in question 
stated: 
that an audit had revealed plaintiff's client 
files to be poorly quoted, handled and 
documented. 
The language refers to bu t one aspect 
of plaintiff's employment with defen-
dants , and does not impugn his profes-
sional fitness or ability to perform. As 
such, the words are not actionable as a 
mat t e r of law, and Count V is 
dismissed. 
Taking plaintiff's allegations as 
t rue , and reading them in the l ight 
most favorable to h im which we are 
required to do, t he court finds t h a t 
plaintiff has not satisfied the requisite 
specificity of pleading necessary to 
survive a motion to dismiss. Accord-
ingly, the motion to dismiss is granted 
and the sui t is dismissed in its 
entirety. 
So Ordered. 
LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. 
ICC 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit 
B R O T H E R H O O D O F LOCOMO-
TIVE ENGINEERS v. INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE COMMISSION, et al., 
and M I S S O U R I - K A N S A S - T E X A S 
RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Inter-
veners; UNITED TRANSPORTA-
TION UNION v. UNITED STATES 
O F AMERICA, et al, and Same, Inter-
venors, Nos. 83-2290 and 83-2317, Ju ly 
12, 1985; Order Amending Dissenting 
Opinion Ju ly 19, 1985 
Peti t ions for review of orders of the 
In te rs ta te Commerce Commission. 
Previous opinion (119 LRRM 2258) 
amended; orders vacated and case 
remanded. 
Before W R I G H T and MIKVA, Cir-
cui t Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior 
Circuit Judge. 
Full Text of Order 
I t is O R D E R E D by the court, sua 
sponte, t h a t the opinion for the court 
filed by Circuit Judge Wright on May 
3, 1985 be, and hereby is, amended as 
follows: 
The fourth full paragraph on page 3 
[119 L R R M 2258, r ight hand column, 
fifth full pa rag raph of opinion] is 
amended to read: 
Because we find t h a t ICC made no 
semblance of a showing tha t the ex-
emption was necessary, as required by 
the exemption author i ty section, we 
vacate the ICC decisions and remand 
the case to the Commission for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
T h e only pa ragraph of text on page 
22 [119 L R R M 2265, r ight hand col-
u m n , last pa ragraph and 119 LRRM 
2266, left hand column, lines 1-2] is 
r e p l a c e d w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g 
paragraph : 
We t h u s vacate the 1983 orders and 
remand the case to the Commission. 
T h e Commission is not empowered to 
rely mechanically on its approval of 
the underlying t ransact ion as justifi-
cation for the denial of a s ta tutory 
r ight . On remand, to exercise its ex-
emption author i ty , the Commission 
m u s t explain why terminat ion of the 
asserted r ight to part icipate in crew 
selection is necessary to effectuate the 
pro-competitive purpose of the g ran t 
of t rackage r ights or some other pur-
pose sufficiently related to the t rans -
action. Until such a finding of necessi-
ty is made, the provisions of the 
Railway Labor Act and the Inters tate 
Commerce Act remain in force. 
Footnote 10 on page 22 [119 L R R M 
2266] is deleted. 
Order 
I t is ORDERED, by the Court, sua 
sponte, t h a t the Dissenting Opinion 
filed by Senior Circuit Judge MacKin-
non on May 3, 1985 be, and hereby is, 
amended as follows: 
Page 6, line 10, [119 LRRM 2268, left 
hand column, first full paragraph line 
